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Abstract. Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering 
between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or 
other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that 
a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative 
utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does 
not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions. 
1. Introduction 
It is a fact of everyday life that we make a difference in our moral 
assessments between the case when an acting agent harms or benefits 
himself and the case when other people are harmed or benefit from the 
action. The goal of this note is to identify a small set of general criteria that 
may account for this asymmetry and discuss their relevance to broadly-
conceived utilitarian decision-making. Since the account is minimalist, no 
claim is made that these principles can or should be used in actual decision-
making. There are so many more aspects of agency, for example the 
action/omission distinction (Baron, 1996), the notion of moral hazard and 
the principal-agent problem (Spence, Zeckhauser, 1971) in economics that 
lead to the development of agency theory (see Eisenhardt, 1989, Shapiro 
2005 for overviews), or the Knobe effect (Knobe, 2003ab), that many more 
ingredients would be needed apart from the ones discussed in this short note 
in order to obtain a reasonable understanding of the effects of agency in a 
broadly-conceived utilitarian setting. 
One of the assumptions of this article is that there is indeed a broad, 
though perhaps not universal, consensus that there is an asymmetry insofar 
as agency is concerned, so some examples should be given first. Knowingly 
harming yourself has a different moral status than if you knowingly harm 
others, and the difference may be thought to be particularly huge if one and 
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the same action results in harm or benefits to you and others at the same 
time. Somebody who gains a lot by his actions while harming others is 
considered wicked. Conversely, exposing yourself to unavoidable harm 
when someone else benefits from your action is often considered 
commendable. For example, a ‘good soldier’ is supposed to endure a lot of 
suffering for the greater good of the people he is fighting for. As another 
example, a firefighter who dies while attempting to save others will be 
praised as a hero, although he is generally expected to guard his life as best 
as he can. In contrast to this, a politician who orders someone else to take a 
huge risk in order to further his own agenda will likely not be held in such 
high regard once things have gone awry. The question is whether it is 
possible to find general principles to guide such assessments and how 
compatible these are with common everyday assessments. 
2. Maximizing Utility and the Weak Negative Utilitarian 
Principle 
Suppose that an action can do harm to yourself or others (H), you or others 
may benefit from it (G), or the action is neutral (N). This discrete 
conceptualization should be understood as an abstraction from the 
underlying threshold-based utility assessments. Harm and benefits may 
come in relative or absolute variants. Relative harm is done when the utility 
after an action minus the utility before an action exceeds a negative 
threshold. Relative benefits are obtained when the utility after an action 
minus the utility before an action exceeds a positive threshold. Finally, an 
action is neutral when neither of these cases obtain. A notion of absolute 
harm can be formulated by looking at the difference between the utility 
after an action and a negative threshold. If the difference is negative, the 
corresponding amount of harm has been done, provided that the utility 
before the action was above the negative threshold (otherwise the harm had 
been done earlier). The definition of absolute benefits is analogous for a 
positive threshold, and the neutral case is defined as before. All of this can 
be formulated in a precise way in a multi-agent utilitarian framework and it 
can be combined with the standard treatment of risk and Expected Utility 
theory, but these details do not matter for the following discussion, which, 
for the sake of simplicity, only takes into account abstract orderings based 
on the H/N/G distinction. Naturally, this discrete distinction only makes 
sense as long as the respective levels of harm and benefits are on a par. It is 
therefore from now on assumed that any amount of harm under discussion 
is roughly within the same lexical comparison class as the corresponding 
level of benefits, since otherwise a full quantitative comparison would be 
needed. So, for instance, if G stands for a life saved, then H cannot stand 
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for a pinprick. Conversely, if H stands for a possibly avoidable death, 
then G cannot stand for the fact that somebody gets a chocolate bar. 
However, deaths and lives are commensurable, and pinpricks and chocolate 
bars are also commensurable. (While this is a controversial assumption, 
some weighing of harm against benefit will always be necessary, or else 
paradoxes might occur and many principles such as the ‘double effect 
principle’ could no longer be formulated at all.) It would also be possible to 
use multiple thresholds and thereby distinguish strong from weak harm and 
benefits, but to keep things simple only the H/N/G distinction will be used 
in what follows. Suppose, as a further simplification, that only one other 
agent is affected by the acting agent’s action. Again, this is not a principal 
limitation, but only simplifies matters. 
Under these assumptions – that the H/N/G distinction is taken as a basis, 
and that only the acting agent and another agent who is affected by the 
action are considered – an action can have nine possible effects: GG, GN, 
NG, NN, NH, HN, HH, HG, GH. Let the first letter stand for the acting 
agent and the second one for the other agent. Then, for instance, NG means 
that someone’s action is neutral for himself and beneficial to someone else. 
To give another example, HG means the acting agent harms himself and in 
doing so does good to someone else. One may now ask how these nine 
options should be ordered, and according to what criteria such an ordering 
should take place. Ideally, these criteria ought to be minimal and give some 
insights into common intuitive assessments of actions. If they can be found 
for the H/N/G distinction, it seems likely that an analogous answer could be 
given for a more complicated account based on continuous utility functions 
with thresholds. 
In a broadly-conceived utilitarian setting, utility maximization must 
somehow enter the picture. The combination GG should always be on top, 
because it represents the optimal case when someone obtains benefits for 
himself and for others by the same action, which is truly a win-win 
situation. Or so one might think. By the same token, HH should always be 
the least preferred course of action, for you cannot do any worse than 
harming yourself and others at the same time. These considerations suggest 
the following principles: 
(OPT) Win-Win Principle: 
An action in which all involved parties win more than the benefit 
threshold (‘win-win’) is preferable to all other outcomes. 
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(PES) Lose-Lose Principle: 
An action that harms everyone (‘lose-lose’) is the least preferable. 
If one buys into utility maximization as a general principle in the first place, 
then the following variant will subsume the two previous principles: 
(MAX) Utility Maximization Principle: 
Aim to maximize overall utility. 
This principle has been deliberately left vague in order to illustrate that 
utility maximization can be understood in slightly different ways. As one 
way to make it more precise in the current simplified and discrete setting, 
scores of equal weight may be attributed to the H/N/G classification, 
regardless of the question of who acted for whom. Suppose G=1, N=0, and 
H=-1. This yields the following table: 
 
G N H 
G 2 1 0 
N 1 0 -1 
H 0 -1 -2 
From this table, a weak ordering can be read off: 
(1) GG > NG ~ GN > HG ~ NN ~ GH > NH ~ HN > HH 
Let us call this ordering the ‘unweighted sum account’, because it puts 
equal weight on benefits and harm. In a quantitative setting, this approach 
corresponds to an additive model in which utilities are summed up and 
possibly divided by the number of utilities to normalize the measure. 
Principles OPT and PES are faithfully represented in this account, but in 
other respects the unweighted sum account is hard to accept. Option NN is 
clearly preferable to GH or HG, because an NN action is neutral; it might 
result in a little bit of loss or gain to some of the agents involved, but does 
not do any harm, whereas the other two actions cause harm to someone. It 
seems that harm should be avoided more strongly. Setting G=1, N=0 and 
H=-2 we obtain the following table: 
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G N H 
G 2 1 -1 
N 1 0 -2 
H -1 -2 -4 
From this table a slightly different weak ordering is obtained: 
(2) GG > GN ~ NG > NN > HG ~ GH > HN ~ NH > HH 
This time, NN is preferred to HG and GH which matches more closely our 
common judgments about harm. If one considers this ordering more 
acceptable than the previous one, the following principle should be 
endorsed: 
(WNU) Weak Negative Utilitarian Principle: 
Avoiding harm is more desirable than obtaining benefits. 
This should be interpreted only in the way indicated above, that harming 
someone counts more than obtaining a benefit, because a stronger reading 
may lead to the paradoxes of Negative Utilitarianism laid out by Smart 
(1968) and Ord (2013), among others. Notice that this principle cannot 
count as an ordering principle that can stand on its own, because taken by 
itself it would lead to the following, rather uninformative ordering: 
(3) GG ~ GN ~ NG ~ NN > HG ~ GH ~ HN ~ NH ~ HH 
However, WNU can be combined with MAX by first applying the latter, 
and then disambiguating with the former whenever possible, resulting in 
(2). So we have a meta-order and this combination of the two principles 
provides a reasonable weak ordering, which is, technically speaking, a 
preorder relation. Given (2), one might ask how a linear ordering can be 
obtained by applying further principles. As it turns out, answering this 
question at the proposed level of generality is more complicated than it 
might seem at first glance. This is the topic of the next section 
3. Egoism, Altruism, and the Rule Hierarchy 
One way to obtain a linear ordering is by combining the following flawed 
principle with utility maximization: 
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(EGO) ‘Me First’ Principle: 
Prioritize the self-benefits of the agent over the benefits of others, and, 
correspondingly, avoid harm to yourself before avoiding harm to others. 
As it stands, the principle appears to be flawed, and indeed it leads to 
undesirable results when taking precedence over joint utility maximization, 
i.e., when the agent seeks to always maximize his own gains and only after 
this principle has been applied agent-agnostic maximization is used to sort 
out the remaining cases. EGO alone boils down to 
(4) GG ~ GN ~GH > NG ~ NN ~ NH > HG ~ HN ~ HH 
So the resulting combined linear ordering is: 
(5) GG > GN > GH > NG > NN > NH > HG > HN > HH 
Clearly, the combination EGO > MAX is the hallmark of evil egoism and 
therefore wholly unacceptable. A person with preferences like GH > NG or 
GH > NN is rightly considered wicked, someone who is willing to sell his 
own grandmother. What about a more decent form of egoism? Suppose 
MAX > WNU is given precedence over the ‘Me First’ Principle instead, 
meaning that EGO only serves as a tie-breaker for (2). The resulting linear 
ordering is then: 
(6) GG > GN > NG > NN > GH > HG > NH >HN > HH 
While this looks better than (5), GH > HG might still be an offender. Is it? 
The problem is that if we consider an unavoidable choice between two acts, 
one with result GH and one with a result in {HG, NH, HN, HH}, then the 
egoist’s preference might seem alright. If GH is considered in isolation, 
though, then the action seems to be wicked. Many laws actually disallow 
GH-type actions provided that the harm involved is high enough, no matter 
how large the corresponding benefit is to the delinquent. 
Even if one takes (6) to be acceptable, there is another alternative to 
consider. Parallel to EGO, an altruist principle may be introduced: 
(ALT) ‘Others First’ Principle: 
Prioritize the benefit to others over self-benefits, and, correspondingly, 
avoid harm to others first before avoiding harm to yourself. 
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This principle corresponds to the weak ordering: 
(7) GG ~ NG ~ HG > GN ~ NN ~ HN > GH ~ NH ~ HH 
While the second part of the principle sounds strange, since always 
preferring to harm yourself over harming others does not seem to improve a 
person’s survival capabilities, it is noteworthy that the linear ordering 
resulting from prioritizing ALT > MAX does not look nearly as bad as (5): 
(8) GG > NG > HG > GN > NN > HN > GH > NH > HH 
Problematic in this is HG > GN , though. The alternative HG is a huge 
sacrifice, and the recommendation to let go of GN in favor of HG might be 
hard to swallow for anyone but a die-hard altruist. Perhaps GN and NG are 
the sane variants of egoism and altruism, whereas GH and HG are the 
insane versions. (Remember that we are talking about reasonably high 
levels of harm and benefits.) Be that as it may, a better result can be 
obtained by using ALT only as a tie-breaker for (2), resulting in: 
(9) GG > NG > GN > NN > HG > GH > HN > NH > HH 
This is the winning candidate for an ordering of possible acts in this 
abstract fashion. It is based on three simple principles with rule priorities 
MAX > WNU > ALT and should be intuitively acceptable to anyone but the 
wicked and social Darwinists. 
There is an alternative to this principle based on Mill (1859, 1869) who 
wrote that “... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.” (Mill 1869, p. 9) While this famous passage describes a 
deontic restriction of liberty, it can be modified into the following utilitarian 
rule: 
(MIL) No Harm Principle: 
Do not harm others if at all avoidable. 
To this principle corresponds the weak ordering: 
(10) GG ~ GN ~ NG ~ NN ~ HG ~ HN > GH ~ NH ~ HH 
Since it leaves HG and NN in one partition, WNU is needed this time. 
However, the rule hierarchy MIL > MAX > WNU still does not lead to a 
linear ordering: 
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(11) GG > GN ~ NG > NN > HG > GH > HN > NH > HH 
The combination GN ~ NG cannot be resolved by MIL, and the same holds 
for the rule hierarchy MAX > WNU > MIL. But perhaps this is exactly how 
things ought to be. As long as nobody is harmed, acting for your own 
benefit should be treated as being on a par with acting for the benefit of 
others. 
Considering that they are based on such simple principles, it is puzzling that 
neither of the above orderings necessarily reflects our common everyday 
judgments. It seems that we often violate even the Win-Win Principle in 
everyday assessments of actions, both prior to acting and in after-action 
evaluations. For example, a nun who gives up her own good for the sake of 
helping starving children, leading to a life of many HG-decisions, is 
sometimes praised more than a talented and wealthy businessman who 
manages to achieve many GG actions in his continuous striving for Pareto 
optimality, and it is easy to come up with similar examples for HG > GN. 
These preferences directly violate MAX and also violate harm avoidance 
principles like WNU and its stronger variants. There is perhaps a virtue-
ethical reason why we tend to value HG-actions higher than GN- or GG-
actions: The former leave no doubts about the proper motives of the agent, 
whereas the latter allow for a purely egoistic interpretation. When someone 
runs into a burning house to save a child and manages to bring it to safety 
only to later succumb to his own injuries, a clear-cut HG action, we 
consider him a hero. If, on the other hand, a board member of a big 
pharmaceutical company reaches out to help a dying child whose parents 
cannot afford the expensive medication, and by this action gets so much 
publicity that the company’s stock options rise and millions can be saved on 
advertising, opinions about the action may be divided. Helping the child is 
good, but doubts about the motives remain. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Some principles have been identified that in the appropriate order of 
application lead to an intuitively acceptable ordering of action alternatives 
categorized by the H/N/G scheme. One of them that might appear to reflect 
a utilitarian spirit, principle EGO, had to be rejected, because it leads to 
highly counterintuitive orderings. Moreover, none of the proposed 
principles clearly mirrored our everyday assessments. While it seems that 
the H/N/G distinction is too coarse-grained for an adequate evaluation of 
actions in general, and it has not been claimed that it could serve this 
purpose, it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at the ordering principles 
that might underlie our everyday assessments when additional factors are 
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taken into account. Is it perhaps possible to find rational criteria that 
result in HG > GG? If so, then such an ordering cannot be based on utility 
maximization or a combination of the other principles discussed in this 
article, and so my overall conclusion is negative: If there is a rational 
justification in a broadly-conceived utilitarian setting for the above 
assessments of actions that cannot be explained by the H/N/G scheme, then 
it must hinge on other, hitherto unknown factors. 
Since the H/N/G distinction is limited to comparisons between levels of 
benefits and harm that are clearly on a par, future research must address the 
question of how similar principles can be formulated directly in terms of 
utility functions that allow for distinguishing the acting agent from other 
persons affected by the action. These must be based on negative and 
positive thresholds for levels of harm and benefits respectively, in order to 
account for the neutral case that represents very small gains and losses. The 
principles MAX, EGO and ALT seem to be easily expressible in such a 
framework, but WNU and a combination of all of them might pose 
problems. 
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